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THE EXPANDING JURISDICTION OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: VARIABLE ANNUITIES AND 
BANK COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT FUNDS 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
The Securities and Exchange Commission is presently attempting to 
assert jurisdiction over certain aspects of two industries traditionally exempt 
from federal securities regulation-insurance and bank.ing.1 The SEC 
claims that two recently developed investment vehicles-variable annuities 
in the insurance field and pooled funds of managing agency accounts in 
the banking field-are virtually the same as mutual funds, which are subject 
to SEC regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940. (A mutual 
fund is essentially a fund (usually in corporate form), the participants' 
contributions to which are collectively invested in a portfolio of securities, 
each participation representing a pro rata interest therein.2) The SEC also 
asserts that participations in these new investment vehicles are "securities" 
as that term is defined in the Securities Act of 1933,8 and thus should be 
registered under that act. In a related move, the SEC has taken the position 
that pension funds created under the Self-Employed Individuals' Tax 
Retirement Act of 19624 (popularly known as "H.R. IO"), when pooled by 
banks for collective investment purposes, are also "securities" subject to 
registration under the Securities Act, although the SEC has hesitantly con-
1 Bank securities and insurance policies (but not insurance company stock) are 
specifically exempted from the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77(a)•(aa) (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act], by Securities 
Act §§ 3(a)(2), (8). Insurance companies and banks are specifically exempted from the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80(a-l)-(a-52) 
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Investment Company Act], by Investment Company Act 
§ 3(c)(3). 
The specific problems of variable annuities and bank collective investment funds were 
not covered in the recently completed Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
Conversely, this comment will deal neither with the problems in the banking and insurance 
areas covered in the Special Study nor with the proposed legislation affecting those areas 
engendered by the Study. 
2 An "investment company" is defined, inter alia, as an issuer which is engaged 
primarily in the business of "investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities." Investment 
Company Act § 3(a)(l). The typical mutual fund is technically a "diversified management 
investment company." Investment Company Act §§ 4(3), 5(b)(l). Mutual funds are 
of two types: "Open-end," where the shares are purchased from and redeemed by the 
fund itself, and "closed-end," where the assets and shares outstanding are fixed and the 
shares are traded on exchanges and over the counter. Open-end funds comprise the 
bulk of mutual funds today. For an excellent description of mutual funds and their 
operation, see Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. REv. 
181 (1961). 
s Securities Act § 2(1). 
4 76 Stat. 809, codified in scattered sections of the !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954. This act 
extends certain tax advantages to self-employed persons who provide for their retirement 
by making contributions to a fund created for this purpose. The fund may be invested 
in insurance, variable annuities, investment company shares, or a trust of which a bank 
is trustee. The amount of the annual contribution which may be made to each such trust 
and which receives tax benefits is limited. 
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ceded that these funds are exempted from the Investment Company Act.5 
This comment will examine the validity of these claims and explore possible 
solutions to the controversies which they have engendered. 
I. THE INVESTMENT VEHICLES INVOLVED 
The variable annuity is basically a device whereby the purchaser makes 
periodic payments of fixed amounts over a period of years (the "pay-in" 
period), the proceeds of which, after certain deductions, are invested in a 
portfolio of securities. At each payment, the purchaser is credited with 
"units" representing his proportionate interest in this fund. The value of 
these units, and thus the number of units which can be purchased with a 
given dollar amount, will fluctuate, essentially depending on the invest-
ment results of the fund. During the pay-in period, the purchaser has the 
right to terminate the contract and receive the value of all units credited 
to his account, less certain termination charges. At the end of the pay-in 
period, the purchaser has the option of receiving a lump-sum payment 
representing the value of his units at that time or of receiving periodic pay-
ments for a fixed number of years or for the duration of his life (the "pay-
out" period). If the program of payments for life is chosen, the number of 
units composing each periodic payment thereafter to be made to the 
annuitant is fixed at the beginning of the pay-out period. This is done 
by the same actuarial calculations which go into the fixing of the amount 
of periodic payments on a conventional annuity contract. Assume, for a 
simple illustration, that at the beginning of the pay-out period the pur-
chaser has accumulated 2,400 units and it is actuarially estimated that he 
will live for twenty years. The monthly annuity payment to him will thus 
represent ten units. Each month he will receive the value, at the time the 
company makes payment, of ten units. The fluctuation in unit value is 
the investment risk assumed solely by the purchaser. The chance that he 
will live longer than twenty years, and so receive more units out of the 
fund than he put in, is the mortality risk assumed by the company selling 
the variable annuity contract.6 Thus, a variable annuity contract contains 
both an investment, or "securities" feature, and also a traditional insurance 
feature. Variable annuities, first utilized in 1952,7 were devised to avoid 
5 The SEC makes this concession in view of § 3(c)(l3) of the Investment Company Act, 
which exempts "any employees' stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing trust." Hearings 
on Conflict in Federal Regulation of Common Trust Funds Before a Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963) [hereinafter 
cited as Hearings]. See also Wall Street J., Dec. 26, 1963, p. 2, col. 3. Why the SEC makes 
this concession is not clear. It seems that the SEC could have argued persuasively that the 
exemption applies only to each separate pension trust individually, and that, when these 
various trusts are pooled, the resulting fund is not itself a "pension trust" and thus not 
exempted. 
6 There is of course a reciprocal mortality risk, assumed by the purchaser of a straight 
variable annuity, that he may die before he has recovered his full 2,400 units in payments. 
7 The first variable annuity fund was the College Retirement Equities Fund, which 
was established by a special act of the New York legislature and began operations in 
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paying annuitants in depreciated dollars, the theory being that returns 
from investments in common stocks would, over the long run, tend to 
balance the effects of inflation.8 
A managing agency account is an arrangement pursuant to which a 
customer leaves money with a bank, directing the bank to invest it for 
him in the bank's discretion. The pooling of these accounts for investment 
purposes in a "common trust fund" is an innovation only recently made 
possible by a new regulation (Regulation 9) promulgated by the Comp-
troller of the Currency in April 1963.9 (This regulation also permits the 
pooling of H.R. IO pension funds.10) Congress had transferred authority 
over the trust activities of national banks from the Federal Reserve Board 
to the Comptroller of the Currency in September 1962.11 Prior to that time, 
such trust activities had been governed by the Federal Reserve Board's 
Regulation F, which permitted the maintenance of common trust funds 
by national banks, but prohibited the use of such funds for "other than 
fiduciary purposes.''12 As a matter of practice, and apparently in deference 
to the foregoing cautionary language of Regulation F, managing agency 
accounts were not pooled.13 Thus, because of the expense involved, banks 
were rarely willing to handle such an account amounting to less than 
100,000 dollars.14 With the newly permitted pooling of these accounts, 
much smaller amounts can profitably be handled. 
1952. Morrissey, Dispute Over the Variable Annuit)', 35 Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1957, 
pp. 75-76. 
s This theory may not be entirely valid. Some insurance spokesmen who oppose the 
variable annuity declare that past experience has not shown a true correlation between 
the cost-of-living index and common stock prices and that there is no assurance of any 
such correlation in the future. See id. at 77-78; Note, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 206, 207 n.16. 
For a good description of variable annuities and their operation, see Johnson, The 
Variable Annuity: What It Is and Why It Is Needed, 1956 !Ns. L.J. 357. 
9 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.19 (Supp. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 9]. Section 9.18(a)(ll) 
of Regulation 9 specifically permits the pooling of managing agency accounts for invest-
ment purposes. The terminology used in this section was amended slightly in February 
1964. See note 35 infra. 
10 Regulation 9, § 9.18(a)(2). 
11 Act of September 28, 1962, 76 Stat. 668, 12 U.S.C. § 92(a) (Supp. IV, 1963). Since 
the Comptroller already had supervisory authority over the national banks' trust activities, 
it was believed that he should also have authority to regulate those activities; this was 
the sole reason given for the transfer of authority. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &: ADM. NEWS 2735, 
2736 (1962). 
12 Federal Reserve Board, Regulation F § 17(a), 2 Fed. Reg. 2976 (1937). The Board's 
conception of the limits of permissible "fiduciary purpose" use of common trust funds 
was made clear in a subsequent ruling which stated: 
"The Board intended that a common trust fund should be used merely to aid in the 
administration of trusts by a trust institution through the commingled investment of 
funds of various trusts. While the operation of a common trust fund might thus enable 
a trust institution to accept small trusts which it otherwise would be unwilling to 
handle, it was contemplated that trust guise or form should not be used to enable 
a trust institution to operate a common trust fund as an investment trust attracting 
money seeking investment alone and to embark upon what would be in effect the 
sale of participations in a common trust fund to the public as investments." 26 FED. 
REsER.VE BULL. 393 (1940). 
13 Hearings, app. B2, at 108. 
14 Hearings 53. 
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II. THE VALIDITY OF THE JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS OF THE SEC 
A. The Law 
1401 
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines "security," in relevant 
part, as: 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebted-
ness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agree-
ment . . . investment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of 
deposit for a security • . . or, in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in, temporary or interim certificate for, or warrant or right 
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 
The language of this section is extremely broad, and both variable annuity 
contracts and participations in a common trust fund could fall within a 
literal construction of such terms as "investment contract," "certificate of 
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement," or, presumably, 
"any interest ... commonly known as a 'security.' " Proponents of the vari-
able annuity, however, pointed to certain statutory exemptions, noted 
above.111 Section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act specifically exempts from the 
act "any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional 
annuity contract.'' Section 3(c)(3) of the Investment Company Act un-
qualifiedly exempts any "insurance company" from the act's provisions. 
Finally, there is a provision in the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regula-
tion Act, passed shortly after the Supreme Court had removed any con-
stitutional doubt as to the federal government's power to regulate insur-
ance,16 which states that "no Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any State for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance.''17 In 1959 the issue of 
whether variable annuity contracts are "securities" came squarely before 
the United States Supreme Court in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. 
of America (the "VALIC" case).18 The Court held, in a five-to-four deci-
sion, that variable annuity contracts are "securities" which must be regis-
tered under the Securities Act of 1933; furthermore, a company which deals 
solely in these contracts is not qualified for the "insurance company" 
exemption in the Investment Company Act of 1940, and so is subject to 
regulation under that act. The Court stated that such contracts are not 
"insurance" policies or "annuity" contracts within the meaning of the 
Securities Act's exemption, and that the company therefore is neither an 
"insurance company" within the meaning of the Investment Company 
llS See note 1 supra and accompanying text. The proponents' arguments were 
thoroughly presented and discussed in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 
359 U.S. 65 (1959). See text accompanying notes 18-19 infra. 
16 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
17 McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act § 2(b), 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1012(b) (1958). 
18 359 U.S. 65 (1959). 
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Act's exemption nor engaged in the "business of insurance" as that term is 
used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Court's reasoning was as follows: 
"[T]he concept of insurance involves some investment risk-taking on 
the part of the company. The risk of mortality, assumed here, gives 
these variable annuities an aspect of insurance. Yet it is apparent, not 
real; superficial, not substantial. In hard reality the issuer of a vari-
able annuity that has no element of a fixed return assumes no true 
risk in the insurance sense .... [I]n common understanding 'insurance' 
involves a guarantee that at least some fraction of the benefits will 
be payable in fixed amounts .... "10 
The V ALIC case left unsettled, however, the important question of 
whether a large insurance company, doing only a small portion of its 
business in variable annuities, could qualify for the "insurance company" 
exemption. The Investment Company Act defines the "insurance company" 
which it exempts as "a company which is organized as an insurance com-
pany, whose primary and predominant business activity is the writing of 
insurance . . . and which is subject to supervision by the insurance com-
missioner or a similar official or agency of a State . . • ."20 The SEC has 
conceded that a company writing diverse forms of insurance qualifies for 
this exemption,21 but there is another obstacle. The SEC claims that, when 
a variable annuity fund is set up, the fund itself is an entity separate from 
the insurance company and is the "investment company" and the "issuer" 
of the "security" interests in the fund. Under this "fund-issuer" theory, the 
fund itself must comply with the provisions of the Investment Company 
Act. That act clearly provides that an "investment company" may be "a 
corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, 
a fund, or any organized group of persons whether incorporated or not,"22 
but it gives no clue as to which entity-the corporation or the fund-
should be considered the "issuer" of such an interest as a variable annuity.28 
Nevertheless, as a matter of common usage, "issuer" usually designates the 
person or entity against which an investor has some enforceable claim for 
a pro rata share of the assets owned by that person or entity. The holder 
of a variable annuity contract, if he does not outlive the actuarial pre-
diction, has no claim against the assets of the company; rather he has a 
claim only against the assets of the variable annuity fund. In such cir-
cumstances it seems logical to treat the fund, rather than the company, 
as the issuer.24 This "fund-issuer" theory creates a number of problems for 
19 Id. at 71. 
20 Investment Company Act§ 2(a)(l7). (Emphasis added.) 
21 Prudential Ins. Co. of America, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8620, 
Jan. 22, 1968. 
22 Investment Company Act § 2(a)(8). 
23 "'Issuer' means every person who issues or proposes to issue any security, or has 
outstanding any security which it has issued." Investment Company Act § 2(a)(21). The 
definition of "issuer" in Securities Act § 2(4) is similarly unhelpful. 
24 It is conceded that, if the investor outlives his actuarial prediction, his claim becomes 
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the large insurance company, the principal one being that a key provision 
of the Investment Company Act requires that the directors of an "invest-
ment company" fund be elected solely by the holders of the securities in 
that fund.25 In a recent proceeding, the SEC applied the "fund-issuer" 
theory to a proposed sale of variable annuity contracts by the Prudential 
Insurance Company.26 Prudential, in light of the V ALIC case, had agreed 
to register the contracts as "securities" under the Securities Act, but it 
claimed that it was exempt from the Investment Company Act. The SEC 
rejected Prudential's arguments that (1) the insurance company, not the 
fund, was the issuer; (2) the act governs only relationships organized in the 
form of some legal entity; (3) the term "fund" as used in the act was 
not meant to apply to such a "lifeless thing, incapable of action"; and 
(4) the act was not meant to apply to a "minor activity" of an already 
established company. The SEC's position that the fund did not qualify 
for the "insurance company" exemption was supported by the drawing of 
an analogy to the banking exemptions contained in the same statute. Al-
though the Investment Company Act specifically exempts banks,27 it never-
theless goes on separately to exempt common trust funds maintained by 
banks.28 This statutory structure was held to raise a potent implication that 
Congress did not intend separate funds maintained by banks to be exempt 
unless a specific exemption for a particular fund was stated in the act; the 
SEC extended this implication to separate funds maintained by insurance 
companies. Prudential petitioned the Third Circuit for review, and, in 
January 1964 that court affirmed the position taken by the SEC.211 Review-
ing the legislative history of the Investment Company Act, the court decided 
that variable annuities partake of the nature of the investments which 
Congress was seeking to control. The court noted that Congress intended 
to make a functional, rather than an institutional, distinction, and that 
this intent was emphasized by the specific exemption for bank common 
trust funds.so Although the "fund-issuer" theory appears logically valid 
and has received the unqualified imprimatur of the Third Circuit, there 
one against the company, since the company assumes the mortality risk. Thus the "fund-
issuer" theory breaks down in regard to a particular variable annuity once the annuitant 
has outlived his actuarial prediction. However, the critical time for the categorization of 
an interest with respect to both the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act 
begins with issuance and continues as long as the annuitant's investment risk continues. 
Upon the annuitant's outliving of his actuarial prediction, he has recovered all of the 
units representing his investment; he is no longer taking an investment risk, and he no 
longer has need of the protection of the federal government. Cf. note 83 infra. 
25 Investment Company Act § 16(a). 
26 Prudential Ins. Co. of America, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 3620, 
Jan. 22, 1963. 
27 Investment Company Act § 3(c)(3). 
28 Ibid. 
20 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964). 
so Mr. Justice Brennan has likewise stated that Congress was making a functional 
distinction in the Securities and Investment Company Acts. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life 
Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 76 (1959) (concurring opinion). 
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is still room for argument. The Investment Company Act specifically pro-
vides that, to qualify for the act's insurance exemption, a company need 
only be one whose "primary and predominant" business is insurance.81 
It could therefore be argued that Congress definitely contemplated the 
possibility of a company with a sideline in investment activities but never-
theless chose to exempt it. 
The ultimate judicial fate of the "fund-issuer" theory in the insurance 
area will undoubtedly have an impact in the banking field, where the SEC 
is seeking to apply the theory to the newly permitted pooling of managing 
agency accounts. Since the Investment Company Act specifically exempts 
both banks and insurance companies when their businesses are predomi-
nantly banking and insurance, respectively,82 the arguments for and against 
applicability of the theory would seem to be virtually the same in both 
areas. But, even assuming that the "fund-issuer" theory is applicable in 
the banking area, the SEC must dispose of another obstacle before it can 
assert jurisdiction over these pooled accounts under the Investment Com-
pany Act. This is the act's exemption, just noted, of "any common trust 
fund or similar fund maintained by a bank exclusively for the collective 
investment and reinvestment of moneys contributed thereto by the bank 
in its capacity as a trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian."88 More 
specifically, the question of whether common trust funds of managing 
agency accounts are exempt will depend on whether these accounts are 
held by the bank "in its capacity as trustee." The Comptroller of the Cur-
rency interprets "trustee" as referring broadly to any fiduciary capacity, 
and he claims that, when a bank receives money to be placed in a managing 
agency account, it is acting in such a fiduciary capacity.84 The SEC reads 
"trustee" in a much narrower sense, excluding not only the managing 
agency relationship, but even a revocable inter vivos trust of which the 
settlor is the beneficiary.35 The SEC feels that such arrangements lack a 
81 See note 20 supra and accompanying text. Investment Company Act § 2(a)(5) 
contains a similar provision regarding banks. See note 32 infra. 
82 While the insurance company exemption depends on a "primary and predominant" 
test, note 31 supra, the banking exemption applies to a bank "a substantial portion 
of the business of which consists of receiving deposits or exercising fiduciary powers." 
Investment Company Act § 2(a)(5). 
33 Investment Company Act § 3(c)(3). 
34 Hearings 36-37. It is interesting to note that some leaders of the banking industry, 
not sharing the Comptroller's view, frankly admit that a managing agency account does 
not involve a fiduciary relationship. See id. app. B7, at 122. 
35 Letter from Allan F. Conwill, Director of the Division of Corporate Regulation 
of the SEC, to the author, March 26, 1964, on file with .Michigan Law Review. See also 
Hearings 6, 36-37. In February 1964 the Comptroller amended § 9.18(a)(3) of Regulation 9, 
the section which permits pooling of managing agency accounts. That section now allows 
national bank funds to be invested collectively: 
"in a common trust fund, maintained by the bank exclusively J.or the collective in-
vestment and reinvestment of monies contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity 
as managing agent under a managing agency agreement expressly providing that such 
monies are received by the bank in trust." 29 Fed. Reg. 1719 (1964). (Amending 
language in italics.) 
This amendment was apparently required by the Internal Revenue Service as a condition 
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"bona fide fiduciary purpose." It should be recalled that the Federal Reserve 
Board's old Regulation F prohibited only the utilization of common trust 
funds for other than fiduciary purposes.86 If, as the Comptroller contends, 
managing agency accounts are received in a fiduciary capacity, the banks' 
abstention from pooling these accounts under Regulation F is indeed dif-
ficult to explain.87 As a matter of purely legal definition, the meaning of 
"trustee" cannot be pinned down, since the term "trust" is used by courts 
and lawyers in a variety of senses,88 and the availability of the common 
trust fund exemption for such pooled accounts will therefore ultimately 
depend on a court's interpretation of the purposes of the Investment Com-
pany Act.39 
The SEC is also claiming that interests in the pooled funds of managing 
agency accounts are "securities" required to be registered under the Secu-
rities Act, even though that act specifically exempts securities issued by 
a bank.40 The SEC again applies its "fund-issuer" theory and claims that 
the fund, rather than the bank, is the issuer. Here the theory runs into dif-
ficulty because, under the Securities Act definitions, the list of entities 
which may be issuers does not include a "fund," although it does include 
a "trust."41 But, even if the SEC prevails on its "fund-issuer" theory here, 
it must clear yet another hurdle before it can require registration under 
the Securities Act. That hurdle is the act's exemption of "transactions ... 
not involving any public offering."42 Common trust funds have existed for 
years, and yet, until the promulgation of the Comptroller's Regulation 9 
in 1963, the SEC had never required participations in these funds to be 
registered under the Securities Act. Although the SEC has always con-
sidered these participations to be securities, it took the position that, as 
long as the "bona fide fiduciary purpose" requirement of the Federal 
Reserve Board's Regulation F was adhered to, there was no "public of-
fering.''48 But, since the SEC believes that Regulation 9 has no require-
ment of a "bona fide fiduciary purpose" comparable to that of Regulation 
F,44 the Commission fears that "merchandising," or a general public offer-
precedent to an income tax exemption for such funds. The favorable tax ruling, phrased 
in substantially the same language, appeared a few weeks later. Rev. Rul. 64-59, 1964 
INT. R.Ev. BuLL. No. 8, at 12. This slight addition of language has not caused the SEC 
to alter its position. See Letter from Allan F. Conwill, supra. 
aa See note 12 supra. 
37 Except perhaps as an excess of caution which the Comptroller is now anxious to 
discourage. 
88 1 Scarr, TRUSTS § 2 (2d ed. 1956). 
30 To be discussed in Part II-B infra. 
40 Securities Act § 3(a)(2). 
41 Securities Act §§ 2(2), (4). But even if this distinction causes a denial of SEC 
jurisdiction under the Securities Act, this is not crucial. If the SEC prevails under the 
Investment Company Act, under which a fund can be an issuer, it can still require a 
Securities Act form of registration. See Investment Company Act§ 8(b){4). 
42 Securities Act § 4(1). 
43 Hearings 4; id. app. BIS, at 167-68. 
44 But see note 35 supra. 
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ing, of these managing agency accounts is inevitable.45 Of course, the banks 
could restrict their availability to certain select customers, but, in the 
absence of a definite regulation and in view of the attractiveness of the 
lucrative mutual fund business, such self-restraint seems unlikely. The 
same fear of "merchandising" is behind the SEC's claim that interests in 
any pool of H.R. IO pension funds of the self-employed must be registered 
under the Securities Act.46 But the SEC's fears respecting these pension 
fund pools appear less solidly grounded. The pension funds must be set 
up under an elaborate trust arrangement with the bank,47 and they are not 
terminable at will.48 These restrictions preclude such a fund's developing 
into a mutual fund type of investment vehicle available to the general 
public, and they impart to the arrangement a "bona fide fiduciary pur-
pose."49 Indeed, it is questionable whether there is any distinction in sub-
stance between these pension fund pools and the old type of common trust 
fund set up under the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation F, about which 
funds the SEC had no complaint.50 
B. Analysis of Present Regulation 
As far as the letter of the law is concerned, the SEC's jurisdictional 
claims are probably valid (with a possible exception as to H.R. IO pension 
fund pools). However, since that validity is somewhat less than clear-cut, 
an analysis of the existing regulation of these investment vehicles, in light 
of the purposes of the statutes involved, should be undertaken. The basic 
philosophy of the Securities Act is one of full disclosure-with the purpose 
of enabling the investor to make an intelligent appraisal of the risks in-
volved before he commits his funds.51 The Investment Company Act is 
similarly aimed at full disclosure,52 but it seeks also to effect a number of 
45 Hearings 8. For a recent statement of the SEC's position on what constitutes a 
"public offering," see SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962. It should be noted 
that § 9.18(b)(5)(iv) of Regulation 9 prohibits advertisement of these collective investment 
funds. However, the SEC has pointed out that there are other methods by which their 
availability can be made known to the public (e.g., dispersion through the private contacts 
of bank employees). Hearings 8. 
46 Id. at 6-7. 
47 The trust arrangement is outlined in great detail. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401. 
48 No benefits may be paid to the self-employed person until he has attained 59-1/2 
years of age. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 40l(d)(4)(B). 
49 See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra. 
50 Although there may be no difference between the two in terms of substantive 
structure, it is possible that the pension fund pools will far outstrip the old type of 
common trust funds in sheer size and number. This is because tax-deferred pension 
contributions are financially attractive, and large numbers of self-employed persons will 
probably wish to take advantage of this device. This factor, rather than any superficial 
distinction in the type of trust arrangements involved, is probably the main reason for 
the SEC's feeling that the protection of the Securities Act is needed where it was not 
needed before. See Hearings 6-7. 
51 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1933); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 77 (1959) (concurring opinion 
of Brennan, J.). 
52 See, e.g., the registration requirements of § 8. 
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other important purposes, the principal ones being connected with ulti-
mate control of fund activities by the participants therein and the pre-
vention of self-dealing by the directors, at the fund's expense, for the 
benefit of other enterprises with which they may be affiliated.tis These pur-
poses are accomplished by giving the participants the right to elect. the 
directors of the fund154 and to control changes in investment policy,155 and 
by placing restrictions on the affiliations of the directors56 and on trans-
actions with affiliated persons and companies.157 The legislative history 
of the Investment Company Act shows that it was drafted principally on 
the basis of reports submitted by the SEC after an extensive investigation 
undertaken at the request of Congress.58 This history is of little help in 
determining whether Congress would have intended to include such invest-
ment vehicles as variable annuities and pooled managing agency accounts 
within the insurance and banking exemptions had these vehicles existed 
at the time. However, in describing the nature of the investment enterprises 
which Congress was seeking to control, the House Report quotes from the 
testimony of SEC Commissioner Healy, who stated that "essentially these 
organizations are large liquid pools of the public's savings entrusted to 
managements to be invested."59 Moreover, in connection with the banking 
exemption, it is noteworthy that the Senate Report, in discussing the prob-
lems sought to be remedied by the legislation, stated that "commercial 
banks are in a position to dominate the board of directors and control 
the management of investment companies; and thus, when they are un-
scrupulous, to advance their own pecuniary interests at the expense of 
the investment companies and their security holders."60 
Given the foregoing indications of the intended scope of the acts and 
of the possibilities for abuse, the proper inquiry now becomes whether, in 
light of the statutory purposes mentioned above, present regulation of in-
surance and banking is sufficient to warrant the exemption of variable 
annuities and pooled managing agency accounts from the federal securities 
laws.01 Insurance regulation today is conducted entirely by the states. In 
general, state insurance regulation is aimed at preservation of principal 
and production of a steady income so that the constantly maturing claims 
58 The evils which the Investment Company Act was designed to prevent are 
listed in § l(b). 
54 Investment Company Act § 16. 
511 Investment Company Act § 13. 
56 Investment Company Act § 10. 
57 Investment Company Act §§ 17, 21. 
118 H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 5-6 (1940); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d 
Sess. 5 (1940). 
159 H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1940). 
60 S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1940). 
01 For an analysis of present regulation in these two areas and its effectiveness in 
protecting the general shareholders of banking and insurance corporations (as distinguished 
from the holders of shares in special funds), see Report of Special Study of Securities 
Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess. pt. 3, at 35-42 (1963). 
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of policyholders can be met. This aim is accomplished by regulating the 
capital structure, requiring maintenance of proper reserves, and limiting 
the type of investments which may be made by insurance companies.62 To 
the holder of a standard insurance policy the company assumes a fixed ob-
ligation which cannot be reduced by any dip in the stock market. Since the 
insured assumes no investment risk, disclosure is unnecessary for the pro-
tection of his interests. Likewise, the policyholder has no need to control 
the composition of the board of directors or the investment policy because, 
assuming the continued solvency of the company, his claim cannot be re-
duced by mismanagement or unwise investment policy. But, when the 
policyholder does assume an investment risk, as he does under a variable 
annuity contract, these factors take on a direct significance. Yet, under 
traditional insurance regulation, the prospective contract holder has no 
means of comparing the investment performance of several variable an-
nuity funds, and, once committed, he is virtually helpless to prevent unwise 
investment policy or mismanagement of the fund. The company could 
remain solidly solvent while, at the same time, a stock market drop could 
leave the purchaser of a variable annuity contract holding nothing but a 
greatly devalued piece of paper. Thus, present insurance regulation is in-
sufficient to warrant exemption of variable annuities from the protective 
strictures of the federal securities laws.68 
Regulation of the banking industry has not traditionally been focused 
on shareholder protection; rather, the prime interest has been the protec-
tion of depositors.64 As in the insurance industry, the main objective is 
the continued solvency of the institution. Regulation of the trust activities 
of national banks is now vested exclusively in the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency. 65 All regulation of common trust funds of pooled managing agency 
accounts is thus found in the Comptroller's new Regulation 9.66 Although 
that regulation contains some minimum reporting requirements, it does not 
require that a prospectus be supplied, and even the information which 
62 PATIERSON, INSURANCE I.Aw §§ 3-4 (2d ed. 1957). Since most states limit the portion 
of an insurance company's assets which may be invested in common stocks, one might 
suppose that this would prevent the establishment of a variable annuity fund, which is 
usually invested entirely in common stocks. But this is not the case with a company the 
size of Prudential. Suppose, for example, that state law limits Prudential's common stock 
investments to 10% of its assets. If in fact Prudential has only 3% of its assets presently 
invested in common stocks, it can set up a variable annuity fund invested solely in com-
mon stocks as long as the amount of the fund does not exceed 7% of the company's total 
assets. 
68 Compare Kimball, Regulation of Specialty Policies in Life Insurance, 62 Mice. L. 
REV. 167, 226 (1963). 
64 Hearings 9. 
65 See note II supra and accompanying text. 
66 Although the Comptroller has direct authority over national banks only, Regulation 
9 actually affects all banks (state and national) which establish common trust funds. This 
is because INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 584 gives a federal income tax exemption only to 
those common trust funds which comply with the regulations governing common trust 
funds of national banks. It would be financially inconceivable to establish a common trust 
fund without such a tax exemption. 
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the investor can obtain upon request does not provide sufficient material 
for intelligent investment analysis.67 Nor does Regulation 9 require that 
the participants in the fund elect its directors or control the investment 
policy. Since, in these and a number of other respects, Regulation 9 falls 
far short of the investor safeguards of the federal securities laws,68 the fact 
of regulation by the Comptroller does not warrant an exemption from those 
laws. 
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
A. Judicial 
If the present jurisdictional controversy is settled in the courts-a 
solution strongly urged by the Comptroller of the Currency69-the effect 
on the industries and investment vehicles involved is likely to be un-
satisfactory to both sides. If the claims of the SEC are upheld,70 compliance 
with the Securities Act will pose no real problem. It will bring about merely 
the added cost of registration,11 and it is unlikely that large insurance and 
banking corporations would balk at such an expense.72 But the Investment 
67 Chairman Cary of the SEC has outlined the disclosure shortcomings of Regulation 9 
as follows: 
"In lieu of requiring that each prospective participant in a bank-sponsored mutual 
fund be given a prospectus, the regulation provides that the bank shall keep a copy 
of the written plan in accordance with which it is established at its principal office 
(it need not be available at branch offices) and that, upon request, a prospective 
participant shall be furnished a copy of the plan. 
"The regulation requires the plan to set out the rights of the participant in the 
fund. However, it does not appear to require that a specifically defined investment 
policy be set forth; or that fees and other charges payable by the fund be stated; 
or that a balance sheet and income statement for a recent period be included; or 
that the investments of the funds be listed (with a statement of the fund's assets in 
major fields and a showing of the unrealized appreciation or depreciation in the 
portfolio); or that transactions with affiliated persons be disclosed." Hearings IO. 
68 One of the main problems which the Investment Company Act was designed to 
solve was that of self-dealing by the directors of the company. Section 9.12 of Regulation 9 
sets out rules which are designed to prevent self-dealing and which roughly parallel 
some of the provisions against self-dealing found in § 17 of the Investment Company Act. 
But Chairman Cary of the SEC has pointed out the inadequacy of the § 9.12 provisions: 
"[A]Il or part of the rules set out in section 9.12 can apparently be negated by 
exculpatory provisions in the agreement between the bank and the investor. Moreover, 
to the extent that local law permits any of the activities forbidden by section 9.12, 
the prohibitions of section 9.12 are overridden. The rules set forth in section 9.12 
themselves do not appear to prevent or place any restrictions around investments by 
the bank-sponsored mutual fund in companies to which the bank has loans outstand-
ing-the mutual fund could be used to provide the cushion for bank loans." 
Hearings 11. 
For an analysis of numerous other respects in which Regulation 9 does not provide the 
Investment Company Act safeguards (such as failure to require an unaffiliated director), 
see id. at 11-13. 
69 Statement of James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 
11 76901 (1963). 
70 Of course, if all of the SEC's claims are held invalid, the controversy disappears. 
11 The SEC has prepared a short form registration statement for H.R. 10 pension fund 
offerings. Hearings app. Bl9, at 168. This should reduce somewhat the expenses of 
registration. 
72 In the Prudential case, Prudential had already agreed to register its variable annuity 
contracts under the Securities Act. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383, 
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Company Act apparently deals a fatal blow, for one of the key provisions 
of that act requires, as noted above, that the directors of the fund be 
elected solely by the participants in the fund.73 The SEC has made it clear 
that it considers this provision "in a large part the very essence of that Act" 
and that in no situation would it grant an exemption from the require-
ment. 74 This means that a separate corporation with separate directors 
must be set up by every insurance company wishing to sell variable annuity 
contracts and by every bank wishing to pool managing agency accounts. Such 
a requirement would in many instances be unworkable,75 and, as a practical 
matter, many banks and insurance companies will forget the whole matter, 
thereby leaving utilization of these investment vehicles entirely to the stand-
ard investment companies. Another problem arising from a judicial solu-
tion upholding the SEC's jurisdiction would be the overlap of regulation 
of banks by two federal agencies, the SEC and the Comptroller. Such an 
overlap, unplanned and unorganized by Congress, would result in an in-
evitable waste of government resources by duplication76 and the possibility 
of an unseemly pitting of agency against agency. While these problems 
suggest the inadequacy of a judicial solution, there is a still more compelling 
reason to avoid the judicial route. These investment vehicles were neither 
in existence nor even contemplated when Congress passed the Securities Act 
and the Investment Company Act. Although both arrangements closely 
resemble investment devices which are clearly covered by those acts, the 
new vehicles have created new questions of regulatory and intra-govern-
mental policy which, despite the temptation to wait and see what judicial 
resolution may be forthcoming, should be speedily subjected to congres-
sional scrutiny and action.77 
B. Legislative 
If a legislative solution is sought, the first question of policy to be 
considered is whether these investment vehicles are really needed. The 
variable annuity seems a beneficial method of providing for old age. It is 
doubtful that Congress would want to regulate it out of existence. But it 
may be asked whether the variable annuity device should be made avail-
able to large insurance companies or left to standard investment companies 
385 (3d Cir. 1964). And at least one bank has registered its pooled H.R. 10 pension fund 
offerings under the Securities Act. Wall Street J., Dec. 26, 1963, p. 2, col. 3. With short 
form registration available, supra note 71, even the smaller banks and insurance companies 
should be able to afford the cost of registration. But see Hearings 46. 
73 Investment Company Act § 16. 
74 Prudential Ins. Co. of America, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 3620, 
Jan. 22, 1963. 
75 But see Note, 1963 DuKE L.J. 807, 814-15, suggesting some possible methods of 
operation for an insurance company under the separate corporation requirement. 
76 The hearings of May 20, 1963, referred to throughout the footnotes of the present 
comment, were held for the specific purpose of seeking a solution to this threatened 
duplication of federal regulatory effort. Hearings 3. 
77 All three opinions in the VALIC case intimate that a congressional solution might 
be best. 
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and concerns such as VALIC, which issue only variable annuities7s_a 
thorny question of policy the solution of which must depend on the airing 
of the views of all camps at a legislative hearing. 
As for the pooling of managing agency accounts, the bankers' strongest 
argument in favor of this device is that it allows a bank to give more complete 
service to its established customers who already have a number of dealings 
with the bank.79 The weight of this argument is questionable in the face of 
the fact that mutual funds presently provide exactly the same investment ser-
vice and do so with all the investor safeguards of the federal securities laws, 
often with investment analysis more comprehensive than that provided by 
banks for agency account customers. Relaxation of the requirements of the 
securities acts might, however, be justifiable in connection with the pooling 
of managing agency accounts if the availability of that device were limited 
to certain select customers. This could be done by restricting the pooling 
to the managing agency accounts of customers who, for a preceding·period 
of given duration, have maintained with the bank accounts of a specific 
type and of a minimum value. Advertising of the pooling arrangement 
would, of course, be tightly restricted in order to avoid "merchandising."80 
Further, the pooling of H.R. 10 pension funds seems almost inevitable. 
Congress has already expressed a desire that banks (among others) handle 
these funds.81 If pooling is not allowed, many banks will not be able to 
handle them because of the expense involved.82 Since, as mentioned abbve, 
these funds are essentially long-range trust arrangements and not primarily 
investment vehicles, it seems that Congress would be justified in allowing 
their pooling even though some of the safeguards of the securities laws 
cannot be provided. However, some periodic reporting requirements might 
be appropriate to enable the investor to check on the progress and manage-
ment of the fund. The investor, if dissatisfied, could then withdraw from 
the fund simply by cancelling his consent to the pooling of his monies. 
The biggest obstacle under the securities laws to the use of pooled 
managing agency accounts by banks and the sale of variable annuities 
by large insurance companies is the election-of-directors requirement of 
the Investment Company Act, for this provision necessitates the establish-
ment of a separate corporation. If Congress decides that the banks and 
insurance companies should be allowed to utilize these investment vehicles 
without setting up separate corporations, such an elimination of the 
78 A large segment of the insurance industry, led by the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company, is opposed to the issuance of variable annuities by insurance companies. They 
fear that low returns on variable annuities during market declines would destroy public 
confidence in the traditionally stable insurance industry. Note, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 206,207. 
79 Hearings SI. 
so "Open" advertising of managing agency account pools is currently forbidden by 
Regulation 9, § 9.18(b)(5)(iv), but it may be doubted whether this provision is sufficiently 
strict. See note 45 supra. 
81 The statute specifically provides for the eventuality of a bank's serving as the trustee. 
INT. REv. CooE OF 1954, § 40l(d)(l). 
82 See note 14 supra and accompanying text. 
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election-of-directors requirement could conceivably be justified. If the in-
vestor is kept well-informed through required periodic reports, he can 
express his dissatisfaction with the management by withdrawing from the 
fund.83 Dispensing with the requirement of a separate corporation would 
probably raise the temptation toward self-dealing as between the fund and 
the sponsoring institution, since the sponsor's directors would be the ulti-
mate managers of the fund, but such temptations might be reduced by a 
tightening of the prohibitions against self-dealing presently included in the 
Investment Company Act. Other safeguards of the securities laws, such as 
the provision giving the investment fund participants the right to vote on 
proposed changes in investment policy, could be applied intact to these 
funds, even though such funds are not separately incorporated. 
The fundamental legislative objective which must pervade Congress' 
deliberations on the present controversy is substantive uniformity of regula-
tion. Variable annuities and pooled managing agency accounts are essen-
tially mutual funds. To discard uniformity of regulation in this area would 
be to give some institutions certain administrative advantages which others 
engaged in _substantially the same business do not enjoy. This is not to say 
that the details of the methods of regulation must necessarily be identical, 
but merely that the impact of the regulation must be uniform throughout 
the industry.84 If any of the investor safeguards which surround mutual 
fund operations must be dispensed with to permit the participation of 
banks and general insurance companies in the collective investment busi-
ness, as to them a compensating reinforcement of the remaining safeguards 
is necessary. It is clear that reconciliation of the diverse interests involved 
in the present controversy will require a delicacy of balance unobtainable 
in the courtroom. Resolution of the conflicting policies, which were not 
within the purview of Congress when it enacted the existing federal secu-
rities laws, should be left to that body. And this question should be acted 
upon by Congress before judicial pronouncements, not based on the kind 
of investigation of current conditions which Congress is able to undertake, 
force changes in the structure of the collective investment industry different 
from those which Congress might wish to make-changes possibly deleteri-
ous to a prompt realization of the structure which Congress may ultimately 
conclude is best for the industry.85 
John W. Erickson 
83 Such a withdrawal from an annuity fund after the annuitant has begun to receive 
monthly payments might seem inconceivable. However, the annuitant need not be "locked 
in" as he is under the present contracts. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 
89 (1959) (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.). The contracts could provide that, until the 
date of his actuarially predicted demise, he may recover a cash surrender value based on 
the value of the number of units remaining to be paid between the date of withdrawal 
and the predicted date of his death. After that predicted date he will have recovered his 
original investment and will no longer need the protection afforded by the withdrawal 
right. 
84 As before, an exception should be noted with respect to the essentially different 
H.R. 10 pension trust pools. 
85 Three almost identical bills have been introduced-two in the House, one in 
